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PROBLEMS OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE REGULATION:
A Commentary on the Trade Act of 1974
by R. A. Cornell*
Introduction
Few issues have endured the changes of economic history so well as
the controversy between Protectionism and Free Trade. The debate seems
beyond resolution. It has recurred with every major change in the U. S.
economic posture toward foreigners since our earliest days as a nation. One
may say, fairly, that the periodic swings of U. S. commercial policy from
one pole to the other (or to points in between) never have produced agree-
ment or settlement of basic questions; instead, they have been unstable
"victories" by one side or the other, followed by uneasy peace (usually
brief) and the re-emergence of debate as passionate as that which went be-
fore. 1
Like all labels, the tags "Protectionist" and "Free Trader" have become
almost too loaded with emotional doctrinal overtones to be serviceable as
descriptors. Yet to understand them rightly, especially in their more mod-
erate, reasonable, and realistic expressions, is to understand at once both
their strengths and their incompatibilities.
The "Free Trader" argues for the general interest as opposed to specific
interests. Armed with elegant and valid theoretical proofs, he can demon-
strate without difficulty that, in a competitive world with no trade barriers,
a nation can have the highest possible standard of living, given its endow-
ment of human and physical resources. It reaches this standard by export-
ing what it must to pay for imports of what it wants. This is fundamentally
an argument about consumption-consumption pushed to maximum of
quantity and quality through the abandonment of national economic self-
sufficiency and the concentration of resources in making those tradeable
products which can compete successfully as exportables. The passage, in-
tellectually, from these theoretical postulates to the "real" world where trade
barriers, multinational firms, and cartels do exist is an easy one: the argu-
ment now simply states a presumption in favor of lowering trade barriers
and removing impediments to free markets wherever such barriers or im-
pediments exist. The presumption will admit of exceptions-"infant in-
dustry" protection or national defense requirements, for example-but it
is the presumption rather than the exceptions which top the list of policy
priorities for the Free Trader.
* Deputy Director, Office of Economic Research, United States International Trade Com-
mission. The views, opinions, and conclusions expressed in this paper are entirely the personal
ones of the author and they should in no way be interpreted as necessarily those of the Commission
or of individual Commissioners.
As history, the debate is fascinating. Readers so inclined will find a few evenings
delightfully spent in consulting, for example, Frank Taussig's classic TARIFF HISTORY OF
THE UNITED STATES (8th ed. 1931) or, for an update on Taussig's work, P. KENEN, GIANT
AMONG NATIONS: PROBLEMS IN UNITED STATES FOREIGN ECONOMIC POLICY (1964).
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The "Protectionist" argues not so much contrariwise as from a different'
perspective. His perceptions are focussed on an imperfect world where
trade barriers do exist, both at home and abroad. Erected in the past, their
effect has been to create, in the present, domestic industries that would not
be viable in a barrier-less world. Hence, he perceives rightly that to lower
barriers might injure, perhaps destroy these industries. He is the champion
of these specific interests, which he tends on various grounds to value more
highly, or to identify with more closely, than the general interest espoused
by the Free Trader. He asks the body politic to compromise with the general
interest in particular cases by considering and assisting the welfare of the
specific interests-which may be large groups of people who would other-
wise be thrown out of work or forced into other employment, at great tran-
sitional cost. In modem democracies, his position, clearly, is a respectable
one, a position not to be considered lightly.
Modem economic life is dynamic. Change, rather than some immut-
able steady state, characterizes both domestic economies and their inter-
national commercial relationships. Moreover, some of the change is itself
induced by governments, for to have a commercial policy which follows
any principle other than complete laissez-faire (there are no laissez-faire com-
mercial policies in the world today), is to set in motion a string of changes
leading toward specified national economic and political objectives. The
objectives could be served by more relaxed or more restricted trade flows,
as the case may be. The key point is that, in either case, policies to pursue
them cause change. In economic life, change rarely is neutral; it rewards
some and punishes others as it nudges an economy in new directions.
Therefore, it affects not only the general interest but specific interests as
well-not all of them in the same way or even the same direction. These
effects, the constant changes and their repercussions, create without res-
pite the causes of new controversies over the objectives which a nation's
commercial policy should follow. Equally, they generate the same kinds of
tensions among nations..The stage thus is set for recurrent, almost dialecti-
cal debates on the degree of freedom which "ought" to be applied to inter-
national commercial intercourse. In other words, the world never holds still
long enough for the Free Traders and the Protectionists to settle their dif-
ferences once and for all. No sooner is one "solution" reached-and
legislated-than the seeds of a new debate are sown by the effects of the
"solution" itself.
The Trade Act of 1974, the United States' newest piece of comprehen-
sive commercial policy legislation, which became law in the early days of
1975, reflects the kinds of historical trends and conflicts described above.
It is a major law developed as a culmination of several years effort. In this
writer's view, it responds rather accurately to the economic changes and
pressures generated by three postwar decades of more or less unchanged
U.S. commercial policy objectives. It is the latest truce in the never-ending
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battle between the proponents of freer trade and those preferring higher
levels of trade restriction. Parts of the law are novel, others are traditional,
and some make strange bedfellows. Most importantly, the ultimate effects
of the new law must remain a matter of conjecture, as they depend in large
measure on the manner in which the law is interpreted and administered
in the future. At several points, the law leaves key issues for future defini-
tive determination by the Congress, the Executive, and other arms of gov-
ernment.
The purpose of this paper is to explore some facets of the Trade Act of
1974 with a view towards the concerns of practitioners in international
commerce-the traders, the investors, affected domestic industries, and
those who represent all three. No attempt is made to review the Act com-'
prehensively as such reviews are readily available in print.2 The choice
of which facets to discuss is deliberately highly individualistic, and the
treatment is topical rather than sequential.
Background On the Current State of Play In International Commerce
The international commercial policy of the United States last took
a major change in direction and philosophy forty years ago, with passage
of Cordell Hull's Trade Agreements Act of 1934. This Act authorized
the Executive to conclude bilateral, "reciprocal" trade agreements in-
volving tariff-cutting with other nations (many, if not most of the tariff
cuts were later generalized to other countries via the granting of Most
Favored Nation (MFN) treatment 3). The 1934 legislation marked a hesi-
tant but nevertheless significant turnabout from the high water mark
of restrictionism represented by the (Smoot-Hawley) Tariff Act of 1930.
About the latter, Professor Taussig had the following to say: "Regarded
as a whole, the act of 1930 must be characterized as futile .... ,,4 However
this law remains relevant because it still governs the "statutory" rates in
Column Two of the Tariff Schedules of the United States (TSUS) which, in
contrast to the generally applied Column One (MFN) rates, now apply
only to a handful of Eastern European and other Communist countries
which do not enjoy the benefits of tariff concessions extended to most
nations on an MFN basis.
2 The Act itself is Pub. L. No. 93-618, 88 Stat. 1978 (codified in scattered sections of
5, 19, 26, 31 U.S.C.), signed into law on January 3, 1975. The best summaries and dis-
cussions of its provisions are the relatively short TRADE ACT OF 1974; SUMMARY OF THE
PROVISIONS OF H.R. 10710, prepared by the staffs of the Committee on Finance of the U.S.
Senate and the Committee on Ways and Means of the U.S. House of Representatives,
93d Cong., 2d Sess., (1974) [hereinafter cited as SUMMARY ]; and the longer REPORT OF
THE COMMITTEE ON FINANCE, UNITED STATES SENATE; TOGETHER WITH ADDITIONAL
VIEWS ONH.R. 10710, S. REP. No. 93-1298,93dCong.,2dSess. (1974) [hereinafter cited as
SENATE REPORT ].
3 "Most Favored Nation" treatment involves extending to other countries the
lowest tariff levied against the products of any single country which, by dint of con-
cessions made to it, become "most favored." Such treatment can be extended with re-
spect to concessions other than tariff concessions.
4 F. TAUSSIG, supra note 1, at 519.
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In 1937, on several occasions in the 1940's and 1950's, and finally in
the Trade Expansion Act of 1962, basic principles and authorities similar
to those of the 1934 Act were extended and expanded. Periodic trade ne-
gotiations with other countries proceeded apace. Although none of these
extensions made any major change in the basic national outlook toward
commercial policy, there was a significant alteration in negotiating style
during the postwar period. Dealing with other nations on a multilateral
rather than a bilateral basis became the accepted modality, bolstered
by application of the MFN principle virtually without exception
throughout the non-Communist world. The postwar period also saw the
creation of GATTl, the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, which
not only attempted an international "standstill" agreement on the rules
of commercial regulation which would be acceptable to the international
community, but also provided the principal forum in which trade ne-
gotiations have taken place and in which nations could complain to one
another, before applying sanctions or looking the other way, about
alleged violations of the GATT rules. There is much disagreement on the
extefht to which the GATT has fulfilled its purposes or served the U.S.
national interest. It is not necessary to take a position on this issue here,
except to note that, whatever its merits or accomplishments, the GATT
has become the key institution on the international commercial policy
scene. 5
As was noted in the Introduction to this paper, shifts in commercial
policy law produce economic change. The years since 1934 have seen a
drastic reduction in tariff levels worldwide and certainly in the United
States. At present, median nominal U.S. MFN tariffs are in the neighbor-
hood of only nine percent ad valorem, with trade-weighted average rates
on farm products at under 5%. Trade-weighted levies on various classes
of industrial goods range from 3.5% (on photographic and cinemat-
ographic supplies) to 25% (on textiles).6 Numerous key products are
duty-free. Many observers (this writer included) would say that, in
general, tariffs in the principal trading countries now are so low that they
hardly matter as instruments of trade regulation or distortion. Our recent
experience with other kinds of international relative price changes-ex-
change rate movements, most notably-has shown that, save for move-
ments of 5% or even 10%, the effects on trade flows are negligible be-
cause small price changes tend to be absorbed somewhere along the
marketing chain before they reach consumers, the source of final market
demand. Thus, while there probably remain enough tariffs to make ad-
5 Paradoxically, the GATT, 55 U.N.T.S. 308 (1950), never received Senate approval
in the United States. It is an executive agreement, concluded in 1947 under the then
applicable legislation extending negotiating authority to the President under the Trade
Agreements Program-in this case, the Trade Agreements Extension Act of 1945, ch.
269, 59 Stat. 410.
6 For more details on tariffs in the United States and other major trading countries,
or blocs, see generally SENATE REPORT 71-73.
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ditional tariff-cutting negotiations worthwhile, few profound results can
any longer be expected from such exercises.
Coincident with, and probably at least partly as a result of trade lib-
eralization, the postwar world has witnessed phenomenal growth (ex-
cept for very recently) in both the volume and the value of international
trade. U.S. policy and leadership played a major role not only in this
growth but also in the rapid development of U.S. traders' principal com-
petitor economies, chiefly those of the European Communities (EC) and
Japan. It should have been seen as inevitable that U.S. dominance of
the world economy would have to recede from the early postwar peak,
as other nations reconstructed and developed with a momentum all their
own. Yet many in the United States were unprepared for the magnitude
of the slide; by one set of numbers, the U.S. share of world exports
dropped from almost 24% in 1948 (when the total was $53.3 billion) to
under 13% in 1974 (when world exports had climbed to a staggering
$779.0 billion).
The international economic system began to send out a series of
unsettling signals by about the mid-1960's. U.S. trade balances lost
their strength over the years, passed from surplus through equilibrium,
and showed increasing amounts of red ink. By the early 1970's, a severe
overvaluation of the dollar was painfully evident. A new institutional
change, the startling emergence of the multinational firm (usually
U.S.-owned) on the international economic scene gave further evidence
that the world was indeed a different one from that of 1945. It is not
necessary to inquire too deeply into the causes of these various events
and developments to point out that many people raised serious ques-
tions about the adequacy of the internationally-agreed rules that gov-
erned the system, especially from the point of view of U.S. interests.
Why? Because, with growing severity, specific interests inside the
United States were finding that changes in the world at large were
hurting. Imports had begun to make serious inroads into a few indus-
tries and some attention to these kinds of problems was demanded
of the policymakers. A small but glaringly obvious proportion of out-
bound U.S. direct investment flows could be identified with "runaway"
firms that seemed only too willing to leave their domestic workforces
high, dry, unemployed, and replaced by "cheap labor" abroad.
The problems which emerged from these kinds of developments
have been serious in both human and economic terms. It has been in
vain for supporters of traditional free trade policies to point out that
by far the greater portion of the economy benefited from trade and that
the "runaway" firms represented only a miniscule proportion of the
direct investors in capital plant overseas. Once again,the time had
emerged for the defenders of the specific interests to be heard. At the
same time, the ranks of the free traders were seriously dented by the
defection to a strongly protectionist stance on the part of the AFL-CIO,
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a powerful specific-interest group which formerly had backed the
liberal trade policies of the past. Business interests, on the other hand,
showed a curious shift in strategy. Defense of the multinational firm
had become the principal business of their spokesmen, and while the
defense of free trade remained a part of this overall objective, it subtly
drifted into a subordinate slot. Most recently, almost as if to punctuate
these longer-term trends, the twin shocks of (1) the whole petroleum
imbroglio which began in 1973, and (2) the deep recession of 1974-75
pushed all the troubles and all the complaints into sharp relief.
Readers doubtlessly will recognize the foregoing as a sketchy and
highly impressionistic account of postwar economic history. But it is
sufficient to support and explain the point that, perhaps for the first
time since World War 1I, events have culminated in recent years to stim-
ulate a major re-examination of the old free-trade philosophy. This is not
to say that the Trade Act itself necessarily represents a change in philos-
ophy or a reversion to less liberal objectives; indeed, this paper will not
pronounce on that question but will leave it to the reader's decision
after he has seen what the Act attempts to do. It is to say, however, that
the legislation emerged (in this writer's opinion) from a more funda-
mental questioning of basic premises than has characterized any such
law in the postwar period.
One final note before moving on. It should not be thought that
these trends, this recognition that the world has changed in basic ways,
is limited to thinking on trade and commercial policy in the United
States. There have been developments abroad, too. Both developed and
developing countries have shown decided tendencies, as tariffs have
come down over the years, to substitute so-called "non-tariff barriers"
for customs levies as devices for controlling trade to their national ends.
Among the less-developed countries (LDC's), Brazil presents a good ex-
ample of the heavy and successful use of commercial controls (many of
them novel) to serve the objectives of both developmental and macro-
economic policies. The trade-distorting effects of the EC's highly pro-
tective Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) are a thorn in every agri-
cultural exporter's side. The creation of trading blocs and common
markets, however such groupings may promote growth and develop-
ment in numerous regions of the world, does raise serious questions
about distortions of trade.
Hence, disputes, short tempers, and doomsayers abound. EC Com-
missioner Finn Gundelach recently (in November 1975) told the National
Foreign Trade Convention in New York that ". . . in America at present
the road that leads from the exercise of pressure to the implementation
of protectionist measures is dangerously open," thus revealing how he
and some of his colleagues who run the world's foremost trading bloc
regard what they see as the "restrictionist thrust" of the 1974 Trade
Act. A recent British announcement of possible import controls to
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bolster that nation's dangerously shaky economy met with a storm of
criticism from other EC members. And, to consider one last example,
Sweden in late 1975 imposed selective import controls (on footwear,
clothing, and textile items) specifically to keep out low-cost Asian goods
on "national security" grounds. Alarmed at the loopholes that this might
open in the already seriously breached GATF rules, the EC (which has
not been above breaches itself) decided to hit the Swedes where it
hurts: despite the provisions of a preferential agreement (itself trade-
distorting) governing trade between Sweden and the EC, it reinstated
the full EC Common External Tariff (CXT) against paper products which
are a key Swedish export. In brief, the commercial policy world of the
mid-1970's is tense, unsettled, and suspicious.
Such is the context in which the Trade Act of 1974 was passed
and in which it has begun to take on life through interpretation and
administration. Let us move on now to have a look at what it says and
does.
Negotiating and Reforming Authorities
Scattered throughout the Act are at least five key portions which
give to the President authority to pursue greater or freer trade or to seek
reforms in internationally agreed commercial policy rules. In several of
these cases, the authorities are not granted without qualification, inas-
much as Congressional approval in one fashion or another is required
before agreements can become effective. In brief, the five are: (1) section
101, the basic tariff-cutting and trade agreements authority; (2) section
102, which adds a specific mandate to negotiate reduction or harmoniza-
tion of non-tariff barriers to trade; (3) section 121, which directs the
President to seek and negotiate reform of the GAT in a number of
fields; (4) sections 404 and 405, which provide authority to enter into
commercial agreements involving non-discriminatory (MFN) treatment
for countries (i.e. the state-trading nations) which do not now receive
such treatment; and (5) all of Title V (especially section 501), which gives
the green light for the extension, within certain limitations, of a general-
ized system of tariff preferences to the LDC's.
Before separate consideration of each of these provisions, some
comments are in order for all of them viewed as a whole. Probably most
important, there is a certain comprehensiveness and unity in the list.
Clearly, the Congress had in mind something other than a piecemeal ap-
proach to revision of the world trading order and the U.S. position
within that order. The Act has a tone of eclecticism. For example, certain
brief sections of Title I, which outlines most of the basic negotiating
authorities, cover specific points which the Congress obviously did not
choose to leave unmentioned or implied: authority to conclude bilateral
trade agreements (section 105); negotiation on access to supplies (sec-
tion 108); and trade agreements with LDC's (section 106). Towards the
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end of the Act, section 612 discusses and permits detailed negotiations
with Canada and, using the words "free trade area," permits the Presi-
dent to start talking with the Canadians (if they so choose), subject to
Congressional approval of any implementing legislation that might ul-
timately result. Thus, seen in a body, the negotiating authorities pro-
visions of the Act add up to a virtually complete coverage of the out-
standing international trade issues . 7We now have a broad view of what the United States will seek to
negotiate about in coming years. What will it be negotiating for? In addition
to the objectives obvious from some of the negotiating authorities them-
selves (e.g. access agreements with supplier countries, or GATT reform),
sections 103, 104, and to some extent section 126 are relevant here. The
first of these sections sets forth the overall negotiating objective in fairly
standard terms, "to obtain more open and equitable market access and the
harmonization, reduction or elimination of devices which distort trade or
commerce," with additional language to the effect that, to the extent pos-
sible, these objectives be attained equally and concurrently for agricultural
and industrial products. Section 104 states the secondary objective. In
negotiations with the developed countries, concessions should be traded in
such manner as to balance them among countries within the separate
sectors of agriculture and manufacturing, i.e., so that within a given sector,
the concessions obtained achieve market access for U.S. goods equivalent
to that granted to foreigners within the U.S. market.8 Section 126, however,
carries the "equal access" concept well beyond the sectoral level. It insists
upon a principle described as "Reciprocal Nondiscriminatory Treatment"
and effectively provides for the opportunity for U.S. withdrawal of con-
cessions on a non-MFN basis after Presidential determination at the com-
pletion of negotiations that any one or more of the major industrial coun-
tries has tried to ride "piggyback" on the benefits of MFN treatment
without substantially making concessions of its own at least equal to those
made by the United States. 9
Section 126 represents one of several points at which the Act appears
to pull the United States back from a thirty-year-old policy of multilateral-
ism and unconditional MFN treatment in the negotiation and granting of
trade concessions. Other examples include section 105, which specifically
authorizes bilateral agreements if it is determined that they would serve
the national interest, and paragraph (f) of section 102, which provides a
possibility for discriminatory application of agreements on non-tariff bar-
riers to trade. Controversy could develop over these provisions. Puristic
; there is one exception: the Act hardly takes note of the multi-national firm and its
role in international trade. This problem is commented upon further in the concluding
section of this paper.
8 For further explanation and discussion of the sector negotiating concept, see
generally SUMMARY 2-3 and SENATE REPORT 78-79.
9 See SENATE REPORT 94-95.
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free-traders could see them as a retreat to the generally ineffective bilateral-
ism of the 1930's, as an opening for the United States to associate itself
with trading blocs which would behave in a discriminatory way toward
the outside world, and as an excuse for the United States to raise trade
barriers against particularly troublesome competitors behind a smoke-
screen of appearing to liberalize trade with others who are not so trouble-
some. These are possibilities, but the Act itself does not dictate them; to
have them occur would necessitate specific acts of negotiation, adminis-
tration, and Congressional approval which are not now in the United States'
lexicon of stated commercial policy objectives.
Furthermore, there are counter-arguments. It is a fair question whether
some of the major trading countries may not require the threat of possible
withdrawal of concessions to keep them honest in the negotiations; our
competitors are, after all, not angels. Moreover, the recent experience with
OPEC has alerted the industrial nations to the possibility of similar sup-
plier cartels among other countries for commodities other than oil. Section
108 (authorizing supply-access agreements) is in the Act for precisely this
reason. As a matter of negotiating strategy-and, for that matter, standard
economic analysis of bargaining situations under the conditions of oli-
gopoly or quasi-monopoly that such cartels represent-the use of bilateral-
ism, or the weaning away of potential or actual colluders, represents a sensi-
ble way to proceed in breaking up or preventing the formation of a cartel.
In the absence of evidence to the contrary, evidence which in any case could
emerge only after the proceedings authorized under the Act have had a
chance to work themselves out, there seems to be little reason to inter-ret
the bilateralist-non-MFN provisions which appear in the Act as necessarily
leading to a future regimen of less-free trade or as necessarily signaling
a U.S. commitment in that direction. We turn now to consideration of
each of the main negotiating authorities separately.
The tariff authority of section 101, with its associated authorization
to enter into trade agreements, is neither novel nor unusual. It is the same
kind of authority granted to the President in the Trade Expansion Act of
1962 and prior legislation which provided the Executive with the necessary
mandates for participation in the Kennedy Round and previous trade talks
under the auspices of GATT. But it is not, for all that, "ho-hum," because
it commits the United States to participation in the first really important
session of trade negotiations in a decade. It is a session which promises
to rank equally with the Kennedy Round, for good or ill as one may
care to interpret the results when they come forth.
Under this authority, besides the mandate to enter into trade agree-
ments, the President may, incidentally to the negotiations, reduce exist-
ing U.S. duties without limit if they are 5% ad valorem or less, and up to
60% of their existing level if they currently exceed 5% ad valorem. There
also is a tariff-raising authority, which is necessary to permit the United
States to participate fully in tariff harmonization exercises with other
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countries, i.e., to move toward the objective of harmonizing or equalizing
so-called "tariff disparities" in addition to the other objective of lowering
tariffs overall. 10 Under this authority, the President may, as part of negoti-
ated trade agreements, either increase or impose duties by up to 50% above
the statutory (Column Two) rate of January 1, 1975, or by up to 20% ad
valorem above the existing MFN (Column One) rate on the same date,
whichever is higher.
Section 109 also provides for the usual kinds of staging requirements
so that any large duty reductions which result from the negotiations will
not be inflicted upon the economy, especially on import-competing in-
dustries, with sudden and massive effect. Hence, any reductions which ex-
ceed ten percent of the now-existing rate would be applied only in small
annual increments. The Act specifies that these increments may not exceed
3% ad valorem or one-tenth of the total negotiated reduction, whichever is
greater. It is worth noting here that section 109 "stages" contemplated
tariff cuts over a considerably longer period than the five years provided
for cuts made during the Kennedy Round under authorities of the Trade
Expansion Act of 1962. The intent, of course, is to ease the blow for any
potentially affected import-competing industries and to give them time to
adjust to changed conditions of competition. Under the Act's provisions,
very deep cuts could be staged over as much as ten years from the time
that negotiated trade agreements go into effect. This means, in practical
terms, that the full effects would not be felt competitively until the later
years of the 1980's.
The new Presidential authority to negotiate agreements reducing and/
or harmonizing non-tariff barriers to trade (NTB's) represents a major de-
parture from past practice. This is the first postwar instance in which such
negotiations will take a central place in international commercial policy
talks. NTB's cover an extremely broad range of policies used by nations to
limit or distort trade flows and the United States is by no means a laggard
among the practitioners of the NTB game. An NTB is any import-limiting
or export-promoting policy other than a tariff. NTB's can include quotas
(actual quantitative limitations) on imports; landing restrictions on other
nations' aircraft (e.g. the Concorde); export subsidies (including those in-
tended ostensibly to stimulate production in depressed areas); health and
safety standards as well as product standards in general; discriminatory
procurement policies (such as official "Buy American" directives and their
counterparts in other countries); supply restrictions and price-fixing (such
as the oil export policies of OPEC); and a whole host of distortions (border
taxes are an example) which spring from discontinuities and anomalies
in different national (non-tariff) taxation regimes.
Today's trading world has become much exercised by the NTB ques-
tion. The steady decline of tariffs as protective devices in the postwar
10 Id. at 73.
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period has not only thrown the problem into sharper relief but also led to
the actual substitution of NTB's for tariffs in order to achieve protection
while seeming to adhere to the letter, if not the spirit, of the GATT rules.
In recent years, most commercial policy disputes in which the United States
has become involved-e.g. issues concerning foreign export subsidies,
border tax adjustments, market cartelization by suppliers, and official pro-
curement policies-have involved NTB's rather than tariffs. In general, they
also have proved intractable.
In section 102 of the Trade Act, the President is provided with a green
light to negotiate trade agreements, which may or may not be bilateral
and may or may not be applied on an MFN basis, to harmonize, reduce,
or eliminate NTB's that effect U.S. trade and the U.S. economy adversely.
Actually, his signal on this score is more amber than green. The delega-
tion of authority is extensively hedged with requirements for close con-
sultations with Congress and, ultimately, two-house Congressional approv-
al of any agreements that come forth. The Act recognizes that such approv-
al could be cumbersome if not self-defeatingly difficult to obtain procedural-
ly. It specifically provides for special rules under which implementing
legislation would be hurried through Congress along a "fast track."
The foregoing is but one example of several very considerable over-
sight and approvAl functions which the Congress has retained for itself
in the Trade Act in contrast to its freer delegations of authority to the
Executive in past trade legislation. On this important issue of NTB's, where
the scope for new departures in commercial policy is perhaps greater than
anywhere else given the variety and prevalence of NTB's worldwide, the
Congressional retention of final decision-making authority is so iron-clad
and complete that a judgment on section 102's real meaning for U.S. com-
mercial policy is impossible now. The observer must wait and watch,
first for negotiated agreements to come forth, and second for Congress to
bestow its blessing or veto upon them.
Some exquisitely difficult questions could emerge from the decision-
making process. For example, suppose that it would prove possible to strike
a deal with one or more EC countries in which they would forego certain
subsidies on depressed area exports to the United States in return for a
selective relaxation of certain U.S. "Buy American" official procurement
policies. Suppose also that no progress could be made on two far more
basic issues-the rules of the CAP and the border tax question.1 1 In the
first place, will the Congress be able or willing to put aside the more vexa-
tious issues in favor of some slight progress on the less crucial questions?
11 "Border taxes" are an important issue. Many nations-the EC countries in par-
ticular-rely mainly on so-called "indirect taxes" as their chief source of revenue. They
employ the Value Added Tax (VAT), which is a kind of sales tax. A characteristic of such
tax systems, entirely consistent with and even necessary for their equitable collection
from an internal, national point of view (especially within a common market context) is
that the tax is collected on imports and rebated on exports because the imports are sold
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Or will an "all or nothing" philosophy develop, perhaps in the context of
less thoroughgoing negotiation achievements than the Congress intended
when it passed the Act? Alternatively, suppose that Congress approves
the agreement. The deal might then be open to the criticism that the United
States and its partner(s) to the agreement will not really have liberalized
world trade at all but merely will have done a bit of dealing among them-
selves with the net effect of expanding their bilateral trade at the expense
of other countries.
Such questions cannot be answered in advance of either the negotia-
tions or the final decisions. They may not even turn out to be the real
questions which emerge. But this portion of the Act, like several others,
must remain devoid of permanent implication until it produces some
action, both abroad and in the United States. Is it "protectionist"? Is it
"free trade"? History, a few years hence, will provide the answer.
Several other features of the Act's new delegation of NTB negotiating
authority deserve some highlighting. The Congressional mandate inten-
tionally covers much substantive ground. As has already been pointed
out in a definitional sense, the operational concept of the NTB which is to
be carried forward into negotiations embraces far more than narrowly con-
ceived non-tariff import restrictions. 12 It specifically includes foreign export
restrictions, under the mandate to negotiate "Fair and equitable access to
supplies." Obviously, OPEC and its potential imitators were in the legis-
lative mind when this was inserted. As the timeliness of the OPEC issue
recedes, this provision could turn out to have unintended meaning. Agree-
ments related to it could range all the way from U.S. participation in
broad international commodity agreements (e.g., the International Tin
Agreement) to tight little bilaterals that cozy up to key supplier countries;
possibly at the expense of other industrial nations needing the supplies.
The latter possibility is, of course, remote in the context of present U.S.
policies, but it could be relevant in the dim future should international
conditions and the U.S. policy response to them change.
That new NTB agreements could be bilateral, that they might "harmo-
nize" rather than eliminate NTB's, and that they might not involve MFN.
application all have logical grounds. It is in the nature of an NTB as a pro-
tective device that, unlike a tariff which is a tax pure and simple, it can be
tailor-made to a given protective purpose. Hence, NTB's can differ among
in home markets and exports are not. By contrast, the United States tax system is based
chiefly on a "direct tax." The income tax has no such border adjustment features and
cannot have them except at considerable inconvenience and cost. Hence, there is an
anomaly in which U.S. imports are not taxed (except out of the profits of the importer,
not the foreign producer), while U.S. exports are effectively double-taxed through the
manufacturer's profits tax (unless he ships under the provisions of the DISC) and at the
border of destination country. The anomaly produces a distortion of trade that is highly
resistant to removal because remedial action must spill over into problems of basic
fiscal legislation.
'TSee SENATE REPORT 22, 74.
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countries even if they belong to some given generic class. It makes sense,
in this light, to consider negotiating them away one by one or somehow
equalizing their economic impact without necessarily removing them,
rather than trying to swing a blunt and inaccurate ax worldwide. It also
makes sense to deny third countries the benefits of NTB agreements as an
incentive for them to come forth with analogous, economically equivalent
concessions on their own (possibly different) NTB's. On the other hand, it
is equally true that both bilaterals and non-MFN regimes are potentially
susceptible to the escalation rather than the relaxation of trade discrimina-
tion. To put the matter bluntly, two or a few countries creating a network of
bilateral agreements among themselves, without MFN application of con-
cessions to the rest of the world, could become, in effect, a discriminatory
trade bloc. In such a case, movement toward the Act's objective of an "open
and nondiscriminatory" world trading system is not a foregone conclusion.
The Act also includes, as a negotiating objective for the United States,
the acquisition of international safeguard techniques "designed to permit
the use of temporary measures to ease the adjustment to change brought
about by the effect of such negotiations upon the growth of international
trade." 13 In other words, an "escape clause" for NTB's is sought. The escape
clause is a well-known and now internationally respectable interference
with freer trade. It is a mechanism by which, should domestic interests be
affected too adversely or rapidly by the consequences of a trade agreement
via increased imports, specified temporary off-setting and restrictive steps
may be taken to ease the strain. The escape dause is a settled technique for
dealing with seriously adverse consequences of tariff reduction, inserted
into the GATT rules early in the postwar period at the insistence of the
United States. Doubtlessly, if serious and widespread reduction of NTB's
in a multilateral context is to become a major field for trade liberalization
in the next decade or two, internationally agreed-upon escape mechanisms
related specifically to NTB's are essential. In past tariff negotiations, the
escape clause has been an invaluable tool for securing (and giving) greater
concessions. Nations have known that they can, if need be, hedge their
commitment at least temporarily in order to both placate and assist the ad-
justment to new economic forces by specific domestic interests that can be
hurt badly, or perceive themselves to be so hurt, by the removal of pro-
tection.
The authority granted to the President by section 121 to negotiate a
reform of the GATT really covers the waterfront in terms of substantive
issues that the Executive is asked to resolve. 14 Ideally, the GATT or an or-
ganization of its type, serves as: (1) an embodiment of as large a body of
international commercial policy practice as its signatories can agree upon;
(2) a mediating, consultative body to which commercial policy issues and
13 Id. at 23.
14 See SUMMARY 3-4 and SENATE REPORT 23-24, 83-87.
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disputes can be brought (it would be too much in the present worldwide
climate of rampant nationalism to expect or even hope more than feebly
for a truly adjudicative role); and (3) an umbrella and forum for the nego-
tiation of new commercial policy regimes in as multilateral a context as
possible. Section 121 pinpoints twelve specific fields in which the Congress
feels that the GATT, in 25 years of operating with basically unchanged rules,
has failed to adapt to changing circumstances under some or all of these
heads. The President is asked to redress these problems. If he cannot do
so within the existing framework of GATT, he is authorized to move ahead
with any agreements that can be made with a smaller group of more like-
minded nations. Any agreements that emerge from talks under this section
must, like any NTB agreements under section 102, receive legislative ap-
proval.
The twelve major negotiating areas specified in section 121 are quite
important. They embrace most of the issues, Congressional discontents,
and overall objectives that run like threads through much of the rest of the
Trade Act. Consequently, each of them deserves at least a brief paragraph
of outlining and comment.
At the head of the list comes the somewhat eliptically phrased ob-
jective of "the revision of decision-making procedures ... to more nearly
reflect the balance of economic interests."' 15 In translation, this is an ex-
pression of dissatisfaction with the current extent of U.S. muscle in the
GATT. Over the years, the number of GATT contracting parties expanded
mightily, from 19 in 1947 to 87 in 1974. In the GATT Council, moreover,
the Articles specify a "one-country-one-vote" rule so that the expansion
of membership over the years has led to a dilution of influence that the
United States can exercise over GATT decisions. More than that, the over-
whelming majority of the new members have been less-developed coun-
tries so that the erosion of influence of the big industrial nations which
account for the bulk of world trade has been disproportionate to the ex-
pansion of membership. Thus, in this part of the negotiations, the Act
calls for revision of the GATT Articles to mandate weighted voting with the
larger and more actively trading economies obtaining voting power pro-
portional to their economic influence. There is plenty of precedent for
such arrangements. For example, weighted voting has been basic to the
IMF's Articles of Agreement from their inception.
The Act's second call is for a full revision of GATT Article XIX, the
Escape Clause or "safeguards" article. Although the United States is chiefly
responsible for Article XIX's presence in the General Agreement, Wash-
ington now is spearheading the expression of discontent with the rule as
it now stands. In particular, the feeling is that a worldwide proliferation
of techniques-mostly ingeniously contrived NTB's-for taking escape
clause action to protect domestic interests adjudged injured by imports
15 Trade Act of 1974, 19 U.S.C.A.§ 2131(a)(1).
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has, over the years, far outrun the specific measures technically allowable
under Article XIX as it was originally framed and presently exists. Accom-
plishing revision will be no easy thing because any nation coming into
the talks will bring with it a set of conflicting objectives. On the one hand,
it should have an interest in endowing. any revised pact with tight, rigid
definitions of allowable escape clause actions in order to prevent other
countries from having excessive freedom to discriminate against its exports.
On the other hand, its own interest in maintaining an adequate arsenal of
internationally acceptable measures to protect its own domestic industries
could easily lead, when multiplied by the multitude of nations which would
operate under the same rules, to what the Senate Report (p. 85) artfully des-
cribes as "insufficient discipline." Moreover, it is well-recognized that the
LDC's probably ought to be allowed more latitude than the industrial
nations, because of the greater fragility and vulnerability of their economies
to external sector developments. But the developed nations will not care to
be so generous as to expose their own domestic industries to excessive
competition while at the same time permitting the LDC's to close or restrict
at will their markets for developed-country exports.
Objective Number Three is another vaguely stated mandate with a
specific underlying meaning. It seeks "the extension of GATT articles to
conditions of trade not presently covered in order to move toward more
fair trade practices."1 6 The Senate Report (p. 84) spells out clearly what is in
mind here, namely a number of NTB-type distortions of trade which were
not of much concern 25 years ago but which have become widespread in
recent years, especially with the proliferation of common markets and trade
blocs which use such distortions as standard elements of their coordinated
commercial policies. To quote this source: "Many agricultural practices,
such as export subsidies, and variable protection at the borders, are not
adequately or specifically covered by GATT provisions. Existing GATT pro-
visions are also inadequate or non-existent with respect to government
procurement procedures and rules for applying product standards." Such
language draws a bead on some key trade policy practices of the European
Communities.
Reform Objective Four concerns fair labor standards. Apparently, in-
ternational agreement on such matters as wages, hours, and the employ-
ment environment is to be sought with some kind of guarantee of the rights
of private persons to present grievances before the GATT. This objective
could be interpreted as either: (1) an aim inspired by genuine, if somewhat
utopian, social concern; or, (2) a pragmatically-oriented attempt, perhaps
improbable of success, to get some kind of international agreement on
standards which would close the competitive gap between rich nations
with high wages and poor nations with relatively low wages but increasing-
ly efficient labor in certain product lines. Any such set of internationally
16 Id. (a)(3).
41 N.C. J. INT'L L. & COMM. REG.
adopted standards, to be equitable, would have to account for international
differences in productivity. While one can admit of distortions and
anomalies in comparative international wages, for example, it remains
axiomatic that high wages stem ultimately from high productivity and low
wages stem from low productivity, not the other way around.
The fifth attempt at GATT reform will go to the border tax issue (pre-
viously explained in another context). Present GATT provisions allow
border tax adjustments (i.e., taxation of imports and rebates of taxes on
exports) relating to indirect but not to direct domestic taxes. The contem-
plated revisions would find some way to make border tax adjustments
"trade-neutral", that is, not discriminatory by nature against countries
which rely mainly on direct taxes (and hence do not have border adjust-
ment schemes) for their fiscal revenues.
Since roughly the mid-1960's, balance of payments disequilibria and
resultant upheavals in the foreign exchange markets have become, if not
endemic in the international economic order, at least far more frequent and
intractable than in the past when the Bretton Woods system still functioned
with some modicum of efficiency. More frequently, national responses
to balance of payments problems have involved all kinds of import-restrict-
ing measures, including a proliferation of NTB's in the form of quanti-
tative restrictions on inbound shipments. The sixth reform objective
would amend the GATT rules to sanction import surcharges (i.e., uniform,
across-the-board tariff increases on all products) as the preferred means
of taking action to correct deficit situations. While such measures do
restrict market access for foreign exporters, they operate in a uniform way
that probably is the least disruptive of world trade of all the possible
actions that could be taken. From a national point of view, however, a
greater balance of payments effect, as well as the least possible disruption
of domestic economic activity, might be achieved at the expense of foreign
exporters in general and specific suppliers of heavily imported but not
"essential" goods in particular by the use of selective (and therefore dis-
criminatory) quantitative restrictions or other NTB-type devices.
It was inevitable that a major piece of foreign trade legislation framed
in the United States in 1974 would address itself in important part to the
new issue of "access to supplies" which was exacerbated by the appear-
ance of OPEC as a major force in international trade of an important com-
modity. GATT reform dicta numbers seven and eight go together on this
issue. Both express the desire, or at least the hope, that export restrictions,
supplier cartels, and other manifestations of what economists call "im-
perfect competition" in world trade can be brought under the aegis of the
General Agreement. This is a departure from past concepts because, in the
main, the GATT has been concerned chiefly with the problems of and
standards for import rather than export policies. The proposals required
by the Act first would seek to strengthen GATT's basic rules on just what
sorts of controls on exports (and hence supply access for other countries)
TRADE ACT OF 1974 42
of food, fuels, raw materials, and manufactured goods will be allowable
internationally. Second, the limits of national action having been defined,
the logical next step would be implementation through a search for accept-
able sanctions which could be applied multilaterally against offending
countries or alliances that would attempt to restrict or interfere with
supply access.
Although they are slightly separated in the language of the Act, the
ninth and twelfth objectives for GATT reform also are related in substance.
At a time when the GATT has seemed often to degenerate into a mere de-
bating society when complaints about contracting parties' commercial
policy transgressions have been brought before the forum, the Act makes
a dear call for the establishment and strengthening of GATI procedures
for both international consultation and adjudication of commercial policy
disputes among countries or between them and groups such as the EC. It
also goes farther by prescribing that, consistent with policy dicta relating
to safeguard (escape clause) provisions, an attempt should be made to
establish arrangements regarding specific products (footwear is speci-
fically mentioned). Such arrangements would embrace dispute-settlement
machinery as well as data-gathering and surveillance staffs. The multi-
lateral arrangement on textile trade (and its predecessors on cotton textile
trade) are precedent for such arrangements.
The tenth objective for GATT reform both attacks a major current
problem in international trade and contains a possible enigma. It seeks
"any revisions necessary to apply the principles of reciprocity and non-
discrimination, including the elimination of special preferences and re-
verse preferences, to all aspects of international trade."' 17 The issue of
preferences is a current and a sticky one. It began well over a decade ago
when the EC commenced negotiating "association agreements," first
with its members' former colonies and later with neighbor countries,
especially those around the Mediterranean basin. The practice later
spread to developed countries, most notably the members of the Euro-
pean Free Trade Association (EFTA) which chose not to follow the U.K.,
Ireland, and Denmark into the expanded EC but nevertheless wished to
offset the practical abolition of EFTA by some kind of "special arrange-
ment" with the enlarged Community. Either "special preferences" or
"reverse preferences" (or both) characterized virtually all of these agree-
ments. Special preferences are discriminatory exchanges of concessions
on products of special interest to the signatory countries. Reverse pref-
erences were characteristic mainly of EC agreements with the LDC's;
they involved the LDC's granting of favorable entry conditions to prod-
ucts of the industrial countries in return for the EC's concession of prefer-
ential access to the Community for the LDC's products.
The U.S. policy reaction to the accelerating spread of these essential-
7 Id. (a)(1O).
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ly discriminatory kinds of agreements was to push for a system of multi-
lateral, general preferences which would be granted to the LDC's en bloc
by the industrial nations, without reciprocity--i.e. without reverse pref-
erences. At the same time, preferential arrangements among developed
nations were opposed as contravening the basic intentions of GATT.
Both initiatives have received some international acceptance. In the end,
the United States turned out to be a bit of a laggard in adopting its own
system of generalized preferences but this has now been codified in the
Trade Act (and is discussed briefly in a later section of this paper). At any
rate, having pushed the international debate on this aspect of com-
mercial policy to its present point, the United States, in the Trade Act,
now seeks to have some basic rules on preferential agreements adopted
in the GATT articles.
This portion of the Act is clear enough on the issue of preferences.
However, regarding its broader aim ("any revisions necessary to apply
the principles of reciprocity and nondiscrimination. . ."), one could infer
a question. The Senate Committee on Finance, in its explanation of the
provision, says in part: "The most-favored-nation (MFN) principle is the
foundation for regulation of international trade and the Committee is
concerned with the erosion of this principle that has taken place since the
GATT was established." 18 Such language rings true as a solid affirmation
of the MFN principle. But there is some indeterminacy in the extent to
which it fits in context with other portions of the Act (already discussed
several pages previously in this paper) which appear to sanction both
bilateralism and non-MFN treatment by the United States for the
purposes of certain kinds of trade agreements contemplated under
the Act.
The final GATT reform sought covers an extremely fertile field for
progress. In the past decade or two, the subsidy has come into high fashion
as a means of promoting all manner of final economic results. Many nations
grant outright subsidies to exporters, notably those dealing in products
whose export governments especially favor on economic policy or "pres-
tige" grounds. Others grant production subsidies to farmers or manufac-
turers whose wares may then come upon the world market at prices re-
duced in some measure up to the extent of the subvention. Additionally,
there is a large and complex field of investment incentives many of which
have subsidy elements. Nations seek foreign investment in general or wish
to make the placement of capital in certain economic sectors attractive to
foreigners or domestic businessmen alike. The incentive or subsidy tech-
nique also is used by national or local authorities, or both, to attract capital
to depressed areas and other localized regions within a country. Many
states and communities within the United States, not to mention the Com-
" SENATE REPORT 85.
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monwealth of Puerto Rico, maintain development offices and administer
incentive schemes of this type.
The proliferation of subsidy arrangements could lead to a kind of in-
ternational competition among governments with nations offering ever-
greater incentives to domestic producers or foreign investors, only to find
them offset by new attractions dangled forth by still other countries seeking
the same capital or wishing to promote the same kinds of exports. The
problem could be especially acute for the LDC's, which can find the main-
tenance of increasingly more generous incentive schemes becoming ex-
cessively costly in both the short and the long run. The "home" countries
of capitalists who respond to externally offered incentives also have grounds
for dissatisfaction because, in a world not distorted by subsidy devices,
it can be argued that some of the capital placed abroad would be invested
domestically to provide employment for domestic labor. For all countries,
imports subsidized in the producing nations compete unfairly with ef-
ficiently operated domestic industries. In this kind of competitive "offer
more than thy neighbor" atmosphere, there may be considerable room
for the kind of reform that the Act calls for-the establishment, within the
GATT, of a set of internationally agreed-upon rules which would define
both the types and the extent of subsidies of all kinds that would be con-
sidered consistent with openness, fairness, and the absence of discrimi-
nation among nations. At the very least, a "standstill" agreement to halt
the proliferation of subsidy schemes, perhaps with a caveat allowing the
very poorest countries to employ them at wAill, would represent substantial
progress.
The provisions of sections 404 and 405 of the Act, which cover Presi-
dential authority to negotiate commercial agreements with the non-market
(communist) countries, form the centerpiece of Title IV which is concerned
with U.S. economic relations with these countries in general. With the ex-
ception of Poland, Yugoslavia, and Romania19 , this group of countries is
synonymous with the list of nations not presently eligible for MFN treat-
ment under U.S. law. Title IV could strike its readers as having an aura of
complexity; its several provisions serve in the main as a tight, very care-
fully defined, and thorough Congressional attempt to attach caveats,
restrictions, safeguards, and oversight provisions to the liberalizing or
negotiating authorities of sections 404 and 405. The essentials, however, are
simple enough. Section 404 recognizes MFN treatment for access to its
markets as the chief concession which the United States has within its
power to grant to the non-market economies. Section 405 proceeds to
authorize the negotiation-subject, once again, to Congressional approv-
al-of 3-year bilateral trade agreements with individual countries, grant-
19 Subsequent to the passage of The Trade Act, Romania was made eligible for MFN
Treatment by Presidential proclamation on April 28, 1975, Proc. No. 4369, 40 Fed. Reg.
18,389, 19 U.S.C.A.§ 2434.
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ing nondiscriminatory (MFN) treatment to them if the agreements serve
the national interest and the purposes of the Act. Much of the rest of Title
IV consists of "bells and whistles" attached to these basics of sections 404
and 405.
The key caveat, as those who followed the bill's original passage
through the Congress will remember, involves the tight linkage of any new
agreement, including any granting of MFN treatment or any extension of
official U.S. credits, credit guarantees, or investment guarantees, to the
President's obtaining, and assuring the Congress by formal report, of a
definitive determination that the Communist party to the agreement prac-
tices freedom of emigration. Some critics of the Act argue that this restric-
tion represents the insertion of a non-commercial element into what is
basically a commercial policy matter. But it is now a legislative fact that the
Congress has chosen to amplify the provisions of Title IV with what it
considers to be a broad foreign policy objective. Subsection 402(c) (1) modi-
fies the basic freedom-of-emigration provision slightly, permitting waivers
(subject to Congressional veto) if the President decides and informs the
Congress both that the waivers will "substantially promote the objec-
tives. . ." of section 402 and that "he has received assurances that the emi-
gration practices of that country will henceforth lead substantially to the
achievement of the objectives of this section."
Other provisions of Title IV further constrain Presidential negotiating
authority. They preclude multilateral approaches in dealing with the state-
trading countries. The expansion of U.S. trade and other economic relations
with these economies is limited to bilateral relationships throughout. More-
over, any bilateral agreements concluded under section 405 must obtain
two-house Congressional approval. They cannot enter into effect (or be con-
tinued if already in effect) with respect to the key concession of MFN treat-
ment if the Communist party involved is in arrears on its lend-lease pay-
ments to the United States. Finally, all these bilaterals must include several
specific types of provisions; five of these are most notable: (1) provisions
for suspension or termination on national security grounds; (2) guarantees
protecting U.S. patent and other property rights if the Communist country
does not adhere to international agreements such as the Paris Convention
for the Protection of Industrial Property; (3) safeguard provisions-i.e.
escape clause mechanisms which the United States can invoke if necessary;
(4) specified machinery for the settlement of commercial disputes; and (5)
detailed arrangements for future consultations between the parties on the
operation of agreements once they are in force.
As readers who are involved in East-West commercial dealings are
well aware, the overall effect of the provisions of Title IV has been to slow
considerably the expansion of such commercial intercourse as compared
with the momentum that had been building up through 1972 and 1973.
In January 1975, the USSR renounced the much-touted US-USSR Com-
mercial Agreement of 1972, on two main grounds: (1) that the emigration-
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policy provisions of section 402 of the Trade Act constituted an interference
in internal policy matters that was unacceptable to the Soviets; and (2)
that the provision of the Act relating to lend-lease payments had created
an impasse inasmuch as the 1972 agreement had made the resumption
of Soviet lend-lease payments conditional upon the granting of MFN treat-
ment to the USSR by the United States, whereas the Act establishes con-
ditions that run precisely the other way around. As regards U.S. com-
mercial policy relations with other Communist countries, there also has
been little progress since the passage of the Act except for the approval by
the Congress in 1975 of an MFN agreement with Romania.
In contrast to the various provisions of the Act discussed so far, all of
which basically are extensions of negotiating authorities aiming towards
trade policy liberalization in the future, the provisions of Title V20 which
institute the U.S. Generalized System of Preferences (GSP) to be extended
to the LCD's, move directly toward a regime of freer trade. Stripped to the
basics, the system is a ten-year program to provide duty-free treatment
on "eligible products" of specifically designated "beneficiary developing
countries." The products involved must have at least 35% local content
(value added in the exporting country) or 50% in the case of products
originating in two or more countries that constitute a free trade area. There
is a per-country limit of $25 million (or 50% of total U.S. imports) for duty-
free importation of any given product except that the limit is waived if
the United States makes no competitive article. It is automatically raised
over time by the percentage increase in the U.S. GNP over the base year,
1974.
The "beneficiary developing countries" include, in general, all nations
commonly thought of as LDC's. There are, however, some significant
exceptions to this generality. All Communist countries are excluded, ex-
cept for those which receive MFN treatment, belong to the GATT and the
IMF, and are officially designated as "not dominated by international Com-
munism." Similar exclusion applies to all members of OPEC21 or similar
cartels; countries which have expropriated U.S. property without fair com-
pensation and/or which do not recognize arbitral awards to U.S. citizens
by bodies to which disputes have been submitted by all parties; countries
which fail to cooperate with the United States in controlling the interna-
tional narcotics trade; and countries which, after January 1, 1976, maintain
(or fail to modify substantially) any reverse preferences vis-a-vis third
countries.
20 See also SUMMARY 21-23 and SENATE REPORT 41-43, 219-227.
21 After Presidential announcement of the list of eligible countries on March 26, 1975,
Exec. Order No. 11,844, 40 Fed. Reg. 13,295, 19 U.S.C.A.§ 2462, a diplomatic furor, which
continues, developed when certain OPEC members discovered themselves excluded.
These nations included Iran, Ecuador, Venezuela, and Nigeria, all of which adhere to
OPEC pricing policies, but none of which participated in the oil embargo of 1973-74.
Having continued to supply the United States with petroleum during the embargo, albeit
at OPEC prices, these countries judged themselves more deserving of GSP treatment.
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Products eligible for GSP treatment also are subject to exclusions. Thus,
articles currently subject to import relief measures (e.g. escape clause re-
lief) or import restrictions applied on national security grounds would be
ineligible. There are safeguards against GSP imports of products made in
U.S. insular possessions or the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico. In addition,
certain especially import-sensitive items are categorically excluded: (1)
textile and apparel products covered by international agreements in force;
(2) watches; (3) certain electronic articles; (4) certain steel products; (5) a
large list of footwear items; (6) certain glass products; and, (7) any goods
which might later be officially designated by the Executive as "import
sensitive."
Since the passage of the Trade Act, implementation of the GSP scheme
has proceeded. Following the administrative provisions of Title V, Execu-
tive Order 11888, of November 24, 1975, published the formal list of both
beneficiary countries and eligible products thus paving the way for the sys-
tem to come into actual operation on January 1, 1976.
Provisions for Controlling Foreign Competition and Its Domestic Effects22
We come now to a whole class of provisions in the Trade Act that
may have more immediate interest for practitioners in international
commerce than the negotiating or reforming authorities already dis-
cussed. Whereas the latter are, for the most part, concerned with in-
tentions, objectives, and guidelines for long and difficult negotiations
which may or may not bear fruit, the portions of the Act that we are now
about to discuss are essentially directives for action in the present and
the immediate future-action which it is fully within the power of the
United States to take and enforce unilaterally which could immediately
affect U.S. trading and domestic producing interests alike.
22 This section will hop about, considering diverse portions of the Trade Act as they
affect the general topic under discussion. For clarity, it may be well to present the ap-
propriate references here, in a body, rather than to scatter them through numerous
footnotes. The following tabulation will serve this end efficiently.
Topic References in:
The Trade Act Summary Senate Report
Escape Clause Title II, Ch. 1 pp. 7-8, 19 pp. 27, 119-129,
relief Title IV, §406 210-213
Adjustment Title II, Ch. 2 pp. 8-9 pp. 27-29, 131-160
assistance (workers), Ch. 3
(firms), Ch. 4
(communities).
Unfair Competition:
Retaliation Title III, Ch. 1 p. 11 pp. 31, 163-168
Dumping Title III, Ch. 2 p. 12 pp. 32-33, 169-181
Countervail Title III, Ch. 3 p. 13 pp. 33-34, 183-191
Unfair import
practices Title III, Ch. 4 pp. 14-15 pp. 34-35, 193-200
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The United States, like nearly all countries, maintains in its arsenal
of commercial policy weapons a range of measures designed to deal with
two different sorts of effects on the domestic economy that are generated
by competition stemming from international trade. These cover various
sorts of "injury" to domestic interests that could arise from competition
per se even though it may be perfectly "fair" and involve no cut-throat
or questionable tactics on the part of the foreigner or his government.
Secondly, there is a whole class of "unfair" acts (dumping, patent vio-
lations, subsidies, and other interferences with free market forces)
which also could be injurious to domestic interests. Concerning both
kinds of possible injury, it is fairly safe to say that considerable inter-
national agreement exists as to how injury should be assessed and what
may be done unilaterally to counter it. To be sure, this is a fruitful field
for international disagreement; findings of "injury" and determinations
of its causes in fair or unfair competition depend, to a high degree, on
whose ox is being gored. There is no easier way for a government to
find itself labelled "protectionist" or "restrictionist" in foreign trade
matters than for it to administer its statutes governing import-injury
even a little more vigorously than the degree to which the rest of the
world has become accustomed. Nevertheless, underlying all the charges
and countercharges, there is a regime of settled practice in which most
if not all of the major trading nations stick to certain common rules even
though they may try to stretch them on occasion.
U.S. techniques for dealing with injurious import competition have
been embedded in past trade policy legislation.23 Therefore, the por-
tions of the Trade Act of 1974 now under review make few new con-
ceptual thrusts. Rather, they alter, extend, and re-interpret legislation
already in effect for many years. Recall the distinction in the commentary
in the Introduction to this paper between the Free Traders-who rep-
resent what may be termed the general (consumer) interest, and the Pro-
tectionists-who represent more specifically defined producer interests.
This distinction may help us get rid of the perjorative overtones in the
terms "Free Trader" and "Protectionist," so that we can concentrate
on the important point without having it misunderstood-the point that
the portions of the Act now to be considered concern the Act's over-
tures to safeguard specific interests from inordinate damage as a result
of the broad, general-interest policies set forth elsewhere in the Act.
There is an economic argument that has some relevance here and
23 The Antidumping Act of 1921, ch. 14, tit. II, 42 Stat. 11 (codified in scattered sec-
tions of 5, 19, 26, 28, 31, 33 U.S.C.) covers basic legislation on dealing with dumping
by foreign exporters in U.S. markets. The Tariff Act of 1930, ch. 497, 46 Stat. 590 (codi-
fied in scattered sections of 6, 19, 22, 31, 46 U.S.C.) contains much of the basic law for
dealing with unfair competitive acts in import trade. The Trade Expansion Act of 1962,
Pub. L. No. 87-794, 76 Stat. 872, embodies the pre-Trade Act versions of both the
escape-clause-type safeguards and the adjustment assistance program.
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which can serve further to protect the analyst from reaching facile con-
clusions about whether or not these parts of the Act are "restrictionist."
The argument says that there is no necessary inconsistency between an
overall policy of liberalizing international trade and a set of more
narrowly focussed policies that authorize constraints on the overall
thrust in favor of protecting small groups or countering unfair compe-
tition in particular cases. The broad policy can be defended as serving
the interests of society as a whole by giving it maximum access to the
material joys of consuming all the imports it wants and can afford. How-
ever, if pursuit of the overall, liberal policy should work real hardship on
small groups which cannot compete against foreign exporters, or which
are exposed to outright foreign interference with free markets, then the
society as a whole, in the very name of its gains from freer trade, ought
to be willing to compensate the injured through the ministrations of
government.
Few would contest the justice of such an argument on equity
grounds. The real difficulties arise, however, when the issue moves to
deciding what kinds of compensation to provide. The traditional, most
easily applied remedy is the import restriction-a higher tariff or a
quantitative limit on inbound shipments to take the heat off the in-
jured group. Such a remedy is most justifiable in cases where the offend-
ing imports enter under such palpably unfair circumstances as predatory
dumping or violation of domestic patents. But in cases where, other
things equal, domestic producers are simply less cost-efficient than their
foreign competitors, the import restriction's ease of administration may
be offset by two potential problems: (1) the long-term economic cost of
merely protecting rather than improving an inefficient domestic indus-
try; and (2) the cries of "injustice" almost certain to arise abroad as
otherwise honorably competitive foreign exporters pressure their
governments to "do something" about the new "protectionism" they
face as a result of the remedy. "Doing something" may mean retaliation
which moves everybody still farther from an optimum solution. In such
cases, the appropriate remedy may be the more difficult one (and pos-
sibly the more costly one in the short but not the long run) of eschewing
import restrictions in favor of adjustment assistance or other programs
which would render the people, capital, and resources of the injured in-
dustry more viable in the world and domestic marketplace. In any event,
the law (the Trade Act is no exception) usually specifies in cases like
these that import-restricting remedies should be temporary, reviewable,
and aimed as far as possible at facilitating the economic revitalization
of the protected interests.
It should be obvious that legislative provisions of the types we are
now considering involve complex sequences of fact-finding, analysis,
adjudication. They require considerable administrative effort and inter-
pretation. Hence, their thrust and effect depend in large measure on the
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pace and diligence with which they are enforced as subject to Con-
gressional intent. In this light, it is necessary once again to come up with
a "time will tell" conclusion about the meaning of these parts of the Act.
The real tip-offs as to exactly how U.S. commercial policy is or is not tilt-
ing on the relevant issues can come only after a body of administrative
decisions and guidelines provided by ongoing Congressional oversight
has developed. At this writing, barely a year has passed since the Act
became law and that body of practice has not yet emerged clearly.
The foregoing having been said, however, one still can state as well
that in many respects the Act eschews vagueness or indecision. Its pro-
visions for controlling both the conditions and the effects of competi-
tion from imports take three main approaches. First, they strengthen
the Executive's retaliatory powers in cases of egregious foreign tamper-
ing with free markets for internationally traded goods. Secondly, they
liberalize in important ways the criteria under which injury of specific
domestic interests can be found. Therefore, relief steps (import restric-
tions or adjustment assistance) can be taken. Third, they tighten ad-
ministrative guidelines to produce more timely decisions and to increase
the definitiveness of the law's operation. Hence, two implications pop
out starkly for those who are involved in international commerce or
those who represent persons so involved: (1) domestic interests which
feel themselves hurt by important competition now have significantnew
opportunities to petition the Government for relief; and (2) the import-
ing interests on the other side are faced with a heightened need to de-
fend themselves and their economic role with skill and sophistication.
To nail these points down, let us now proceed to discussion of the im-
portant specifics.
One of the hallmarks of the Trade Act is its major, thoroughing
overhaul of the basic escape clause mechanisms for providing relief to
industries from import competition. The revisions work in the direction
of making such relief easier to seek and to get for domestic industries
that feel themselves hard-pressed in the face of rising imports. There
are two principal changes. First, the Act abandons the virtually un-
workable provision of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962 which required
the finding of a link between alleged injury from imports and past trade
agreement concessions. Except in very rare cases, it proved analytically
difficult, if not impossible, to segregate concession-related imports from
imports in general and to assess the relevance of the concession-induced
imports to injury-even in cases where injury as a result of some cause
or another was evident. Under the new guidelines provided by the Act,
imports may be looked at in toto for a given product, with judg-
ments being based simply on whether they have increased either ab-
solutely or relative to some benchmark such as production or consump-
tion in the domestic market. Secondly, if actual or potential injury is
found, the criterion for finding causality on the part of the offending
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imports is relaxed. Imports need no longer be a "major" cause of injury;
the link is established if they can be seen analytically as simply a "sub-
stantial" cause (i.e. both important and at least coequal with any other
causes that may be present). For the Federal agency which must perform
the investigatory work in these industry relief cases, the U.S. Inter-
national Trade Commission (USITC), these changes produce a great
clearing of the analytical air. For many potential petitioners for relief
among import-impacted domestic industries, they open up decidely op-
timistic possibilities that injury, or the threat of it, can be found and
remedies adopted. 24
The Act retains the traditional separation of functions in escape
clause cases between the USITC-which receives petitions, investigates,
and reports affirmatively or negatively to the President regarding in-
jury, with recommendations for relief measures in affirmatively decided
cases-and the White House, which makes final decisions regarding the
relief to be provided. In affirmatively decided cases, the President is
required to institute relief measures (any sort of import restriction,
an orderly marketing arrangement with suppliers, adjustment assistance
if the USITC recommends it, or a combination of measures), except
when he decides that matters of overriding national interest preclude
relief. He has latitude to accept, reject, or modify the recommenda-
tions of the USITC except when a subsequent two-house Congressional
resolution directly imposes the USITC recommendations to override his
decision.
Many critics of the Act see in the liberalized escape clause criteria
a decided tilt towards greater protectionism. However, easy conclusions
of this sort are confounded by other important provisions of Title II,
which alter, expand, and greatly improve U.S. programs of adjustment
assistance. Adjustments assistance is not in the least protectionist be-
cause it involves no import restrictions. Furthermore, it is thoroughly
consistent with totally free trade because it gets to the very heart of what
is supposed to occur in an economy moving in trade-liberalizing di-
rections, namely, the revitalization of import-impacted industries and
shifts of productive resources into internationally competitive occupa-
tions where labor is more productive and better remunerated, capital is
more profitably employed, and greater output is obtained at less cost
in terms of resource inputs.
The adjustment assistance program of the United States was hesi-
tant and ineffective as part of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962. It was
flawed and it flopped. The Trade Act of 1974 corrects many of the initial
24 Section 406 of the Act establishes basically similar safeguard procedures with res-
pect to East-West trade. Here, however, the criterion for relief is a simple "market-
disruption" test: whether the entry of an article from a Communist country is in quan-
tities increasing sufficiently fast to be a cause of significant injury, or threat thereof,
to a domestic industry. Pub. L. No. 93-618, §406 (Jan. 3, 1975).
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failings. It expands the program considerably, making generous a-
mounts of funds and other federal help available to workers, firms,
and whole communities whose economic woes can be traced important-
ly (but not necessarily even substantially) to rising imports. Determi-
nations of eligibility to receive adjustment assistance have been made far
easier to achieve; elaborate investigative and fact-finding requirements
more appropriate to escape clause proceedings have been dropped, and
responsibility for the entire program has been shifted to the Depart-
ments of Labor and Commerce, where it has become far more a matter
of administration than of investigation and analysis. In the single year
that the new program has been in operation, its beneficiaries have
grown to number more than those served over the entire history of the
prior program legislated in 1962.
The existence of an effectively functioning adjustment assistance
program is vital for a modern nation attempting to move itself in the
direction of freer trade. In this respect, the United States is truly inno-
vative. In the first place, as noted above, such a program moves to
achieve desired economic results at a faster pace-and with a good deal
less human hardship-than would occur if the free markets for labor,
capital, and resources were left alone. But, at the same time, the out-
come which is desired from the free operation of the market is not sub-
verted. Secondly, the very existence of a viable, active adjustment
assistance program should relieve pressures to implement other, more
trade-restrictionist import-relief measures. To put the matter simply,
every successful petitioner for adjustment assistance is a petitioner
who has been persuaded by the attractions of the program not to seek
escape clause, countervailing duty, or other forms of relief that restrict
the opportunity for society as a whole to enjoy all the imports that it
wants. In the long run, this aspect of the adjustment assistance pro-
gram cannot be over-emphasized. At the moment, the various import-
relief provisions of the Trade Act all are being heavily exercised; but this
activity, in the present writer's view, represents more a temporary bulge
of public requests reflecting the pent-up pressures for relief generated
by a decade of unusual economic events than a permanent phenomenon.
As the effects of the new adjustment assistance programs begin to
pervade the economy-with the result that fewer industries, over the
years, will in fact require relief of any sort-these pressures can be ex-
pected to subside and perhaps come close to abatement, even as the
nation moves decisively into an era of greater trade liberalization.
Prior to passage of the Trade Act, existing legislation on dealing
with unacceptable foreign competitive acts covered four general areas:
(1) Presidential authority to retaliate against the foreigner by inter-
fering with his access to U.S. markets in sufficient degree to offset
some transgression against U.S. foreign trade; (2) the handling of dump-
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ing cases;25 (3) the imposition of "countervailing" duties, designed to
offset the effects of a foreign export subsidy; and (4) procedures for
countering several sorts of unfair foreign methods of competition (in-
cluding the violation of U.S. patents by imported goods). Title III of the
Trade Act amends prior law with respect to each of these areas of action.
The retaliatory authority of the Executive is strengthened. It applies
to a broad range of foreign hindrances to U.S. trade in goods and serv-
ices, among which are foreign import restrictions or export subsidies or
the interruption or interdiction of supplies by exporters of goods im-
ported by the United States. Problems of this sort may be brought to
the attention of the Government by complaint through the U.S. Special
Representative for Trade Negotiations (STR). Generally, the Congres-
sional intent is that difficulties of this type should be handled by selec-
tive, discriminatory retaliation against the offending countries rather
than on an MFN basis.
Several amendments are made to the Antidumping Act of 1921 but
two of them are most important. First, the Trade Act provides for equal
hearing rights during the proceedings for affected domestic interests as
well as the importing interests. Secondly, the time limits for dumping
investigations are tightened. Generally, the Treasury Department is
limited to 60 days in which to find evidence of dumping. The prior
time limit of 90 days for the USITC to ascertain whether the dumping
has caused injury to domestic interests is retained from past legisla-
tion.
The imposition of time limits also constitutes the principal change
made in the countervailing duty laws. Under the Act, the Treasury
Department is given 60 days in which to make its preliminary deter-
mination of whether an imported product enjoys a foreign subsidy;
an additional three months then is allowed for the problem to be ne-
gotiated away. Failing such resolution, countervailing duties are im-
posed. The Executive is provided, beyond this point, with some lati-
tude to suspend the countervail under certain conditions where further
talks with the offending nation are thought likely to bear fruit but the
suspension is subject to Congressional (one-house) veto.
Under the heading of "unfair competitive acts," a field largely with-
in the bailiwick of the USITC, amendments to prior law also usually in-
'clude the imposition of a one year time limit for the disposition of
cases. A second important change involves the granting of power to the
USITC to issue exclusion orders against the foreign product on the
25 "Dumping" exists technically whenever an exporter sells his wares in a foreign
market at prices below those at which he sells in his o;'n home market. The difference
between the two prices is termed the "margin" of dumping. The laws of most countries
require an "injury test" to be satisfied before dumping duties are assessed on the grounds
that there is little reason to be concerned about dumping unless it causes injury to a
competitive domestic industry.
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Commission's own initiative. Under previous practice, this was left
to Presidential discretion following receipt of reports from the USITC.
Conclusion
The Introduction to this paper attempted to set the framework for
the entire discussion which has followed in terms of the perennial-
and lively-debate between so-called "Protectionists" and "Free
Traders" which has permeated the entire history of U.S. commercial
policy. It is to be hoped that the manner of explanation of this debate,
as well as the way in which the debate was linked to the discussion of
the Trade Act and the circumstances surrounding its passage and initial
implementation, will have served in some measure to remove at least
the worst of the perjorative connotations popularly attached to the labels
"Free Trader" and "Protectionist."
We come now to the hard question. Does the Trade Act tip U.S.
commercial policy in the direction of either of the two poles of the de-
bate? The reader should by now have sufficient information about the
Act to answer this question for himself, according to his own way of
looking at the world. It is the present writer's view, however, that no
definitive conclusion on the question is possible yet. Major portions of
the Act serve less to set policy than to establish broad objectives and
guidelines for a series of incredibly difficult international negotiations,
out of which-in the future-new statements of policy, both in the
United States and abroad, will emerge. The same general view applies
to those parts of the Act which cover the range of unilateral options
available to the United States in dealing with the conditions and effects
of international competition. Some of those parts would doubtlessly
make the imposition of restrictive measures easier than in the past.
Others move decisively to position the U.S. economy for a major thrust
in the direction of freer trade. All of them have yet to take on the kind
of life-based on a sufficiently large and representative collection of
cases-that will reveal what policies they ultimately will represent.
Viewing the Act as a whole, there are good grounds for concluding that
it does indeed strive more effectively than much trade legislation of
the postwar period to achieve a more viable balance between policy
dictates serving the broad, general interest of the U.S. economy and
those which would protect narrower, specific interests from egregious
harm in the name of progress.
There is one important, perhaps crucial, respect in which the Trade
Act of 1974 may obsolesce considerably more quickly than its framers
intended. That is, the Act fails almost completely to take sufficient
account of the arrival of the multinational corporation (MNC) on the in-
ternational trading scene as a major institutional and economic force. 26
26 The Act mentions MNC's in only two places. Section 321, in part, amends the
Anti-dumping Act of 1921, supra note 23, 19 U.S.C. §164 (1970), to attempt to cover situa-
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MNC's account for ever-increasing proportions of the world's trade.
In fact, many observers already believe that trade policies which do not
specifically take account of the MNC's are not quite relevant to the real
issues. It certainly is true that the problems created by the trade which
the MNC's conduct within and among themselves, and with unrelated
parties, raise questions of policy which cannot be embraced by the tra-
ditional policy tools. In a world where the MNC is a reality, it may no
longer be a certainty that "free trade" policies, as they are traditionally
defined, will lead to the economic outcomes predicted by their pro-
ponents because many of the MNC's are large and powerful enough to
interfere with free market mechanisms on their own (for good or evil
purposes as the case may be) just as very large and powerful firms can
interfere with them within domestic economics. Moreover, it is equally
uncertain that the traditional "protective" mechanisms-which the
Trade Act perhaps strengthens but by no means creates in-any funda-
mental way-can be effective in shielding specific domestic interests
from serious, unwarranted harm, or in helping them to adapt to changed
international economic circumstances. If, as both the friends and the
enemies of the MNC as an economic institution foresee, the activities
of the MNC's lead to new sets of conflicts-conflicts between govern-
ments and firms as well as among nations themselves-then we may
indeed find that the policy tools set forth in the Trade Act will, ulti-
mately, prove unable to cope with these new issues.
tions where an MNC operating in several countries supports shipments to the United
States at low prices from one or more subsidiaries by charging high prices, in any
market, for similar products made in third-country affiliates. Section 283 is a mild-almost
meek-statement of certain steps that U.S. firms "should" take before moving any of their
productive facilities to a foreign country.
